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JAMES MCMAHON 
 
 Nature ceased to be inscrutable, subject to demonic incursions from another world: the very 
essence of Nature, as freshly conceived by the new scientists, was that its sequences were 
orderly and therefore predictable: even the path of a comet could be charted through the sky. 
It was on the model of this external physical order that men began systematically to 
reorganize their minds and their practical activities: this carried further, and into every 
department, the precepts and practices empirically fostered by bourgeois finance. Like 
Emerson, men felt that the universe itself was fulfilled and justified, when ships came and 
went with the regularity of heavenly bodies. 
 
- Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization 
 
 
he Hollywood film business, like any other business enterprise, operates 
according to the logic of capitalization. Capitalization in an instrumental logic 
that is forward-looking in its orientation. Capitalization expresses the present 
value of an expected stream of future earnings. And since the earnings of the 
Hollywood film business depend on cinema and mass culture in general, we can say 
that the current fortunes of the Hollywood film business hinge on the future of cinema 
and mass culture. The ways in which pleasure is sublimated through mass culture, 
and how these ways may evolve in the future, have a bearing on the valuation of 
Hollywood’s control of filmmaking. Thus, the major filmed entertainment firms of 
                                                        
1  The author would like to thank Sandy Hager, Jonathan Nitzan and two anonymous 
reviewers for commenting on drafts of this paper. Thanks are also owed to those that 
attended “Capitalizing Power: The Qualities and Quantities of Accumulation," a conference 
that was held at York University in Toronto on 28-30 September, 2012. 
T 
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Hollywood discount expected future earnings to present prices according to their 
perception of the social-historical state of pleasure. 
 
Included in the capitalization formula is a risk coefficient (δ). This coefficient denotes 
the degree of confidence capitalists have in their earnings predictions. This 
relationship between expected earnings and risk is visible when we write the 
capitalization equation in a simplified form.2 Capitalization at any given time (Kt) is 
equal to the discounted value of expected future earnings (EE). Expected future 
earnings are discounted by two variables: a rate of return that capitalists feel they can 
confidently get (rc) and the risk coefficient (δ). Put all of these pieces together and you 
have the following equation: 
 
𝐾𝑡 =
𝐸𝐸 
𝑟𝑐  ×  δ
 
 
Risk is an important variable in the capitalization of cinema. From the perspective of 
investment, the future shape of cinema cannot be so uncertain that capitalists are 
unable to estimate, with even a modicum of confidence, how the earnings of a possible 
film project will rank in the order of cinema. For capitalists to invest, the risk 
coefficient has to be finite, which in turn means that, however uncertain, capitalists 
expect the future of cinema to have determinable boundaries. Even uncertain 
estimations cannot retain the idea that infinite possibilities make the future order of 
cinema—e.g., how many films, what types of films, and what is popular—completely 
unknowable. Conversely, confidence in the capitalization of cinema can increase if 
risk perceptions about the volatility of a film’s earnings can be decreased. Thus, 
capitalists are interested in creating a cultural environment where films have 
financial trajectories like comets in the sky. If the world of cinema can be made to 
have ‘stable’ laws of motion, vested interests can depend on this machine-like 
regularity when it translates the art of cinema into the quantities of capital.3 
 
The first section of this paper will outline how the order of cinema itself is relevant to 
the capitalization of cinema. The rest of the paper investigates the historical 
development of risk in the Hollywood film business. Using opening theatres as a proxy 
for future expectations, the paper demonstrates how, from 1981 to 2011, Hollywood 
has improved its ability to predict the financial rankings of its films. More specifically, 
the Hollywood film business has become better at predicting what films will earn a 
                                                        
2 For the purposes of the paper, I am temporarily ignoring hype (H), which is also in the 
numerator of the capitalization equation. 
3 These metaphors are taken from Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (Mumford 2010). 
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greater-than-average share of all US box-office gross revenues through a wide release 
strategy. This finding suggests that confidence in film earnings projections has 
increased.  
 
Before proceeding, a quick note on the scope of this paper: The capital-as-power 
framework, which was first developed by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, is 
instrumental to this analysis of risk in the Hollywood film business (Nitzan & Bichler 
2009). The capital-as-power framework, however, automatically nudges the 
empirical analysis found in this paper towards much larger empirical and theoretical 
questions. Most importantly, the capital-as-power framework, by design, engenders 
curiosities about the connection between risk and differential accumulation. While it 
would certainly make for a more robust picture of the Hollywood film business, an 
analysis of differential accumulation is beyond the scope of this article. 
 
For one thing, an applied theory of differential accumulation would need to break the 
category ‘the Hollywood film business’ into smaller parts. Indeed, firms in the 
Hollywood film business can be separated according to whether they produce, 
distribute or exhibit films; and this separation would allow us to focus on major filmed 
entertainment, the group of firms that warrant a comparison with the historical 
performance of dominant capital. Commonly known as the ‘Hollywood studios,’ 
major filmed entertainment is primarily in the business of distribution and is 
comprised of six firms: Disney, Paramount, Colombia, 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros. 
and Universal. 
 
Yet, for the more immediate purpose of analyzing risk and the capitalization of 
cinema, ‘the Hollywood film business’ remains an appropriate category, at least as a 
starting point for future research. Just as Nitzan and Bichler note how the universal 
quality of the capitalization formula makes ‘people the world over march to the 
invisible command of capital’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.270), risk perceptions about 
cinema are not simply particular to the owners of major filmed entertainment. In the 
Hollywood film business, producers, exhibitors, agents, actors and directors are 
united with major filmed entertainment because they are all ‘free’ to apply the 
instrumental logic of capitalization to the world of cinema and the industrial art of 
filmmaking.  
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Risk and the Future Order of Cinema 
 
Capitalization is not a crystal ball in which the future is revealed to vested interests. 
As Nitzan and Bichler emphasize in their description of capitalization, capitalists are 
no better at predicting the future than anyone else—‘like the rest of us, they can never 
see [the future]’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.187).4 However, capitalization is, by design, 
concerned with the future of investment; it is a logic that is obsessed with estimating 
future earnings and whether they will or will not translate into actual earnings. By 
following the rituals of capitalization, the Hollywood film business is concerned with 
the future of mass culture.  
 
Risk is a variable in the capitalization equation. It is an ex ante variable in the 
valuation of an asset and not an ex post explanation for why a capitalist ‘deserved’ a 
particular rate of return.5 Risk is a partly subjective factor that shapes the way a claim 
on future earnings is assessed. If capitalization discounts the size and pattern of a 
future stream of earnings, risk is the expression of the ‘degree of confidence capitalists 
have in their own predictions’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.208). Nitzan and Bichler argue 
that this degree of confidence appears in the capitalization equation as a risk 
coefficient (δ). A smaller δ indicates a greater the degree of confidence and a larger 
capitalization, and vice versa when δ is larger. If, for instance, there is growing 
uncertainty about the size and pattern of a future stream of earnings, δ will increase 
and the asset in question will be discounted to a lower present price. This outcome 
can be derived from the capitalization equation, which can be presented once more: 
 
𝐾𝑡 =
𝐸𝐸 
𝑟𝑐  ×  δ
 
 
How can we understand the role of risk in the capitalization of cinema? One of the 
ways is to think of how the world of cinema itself, as a composition of films, is an 
object of risk perceptions. The shape and order of cinema becomes significant for the 
rituals of capitalization because, in a sense, every film is in a cohort. For every year, a 
set of films is released and each film in the set acquires a financial ranking by virtue 
of being capitalized. To explain how this relates to risk perceptions in the Hollywood 
film business, let me provide some background about the quantitative language of 
capital and its application in the art of filmmaking.  
                                                        
4 For a concise anthropology of capitalization, see (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, pp.147–166). 
5 Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of risk is different from the neo-classical theory of risk. For 
their critique of the ‘risk premium’ and its role in the construction of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), see (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, pp.198–210) 
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The application of capitalization to the qualitative world of cinema implies that the 
qualities of films have become what Herbert Marcuse would call ‘quantifiable 
qualities’ (Marcuse 1991, p.136). From the perspective of investment, the industrial 
art of filmmaking and the social world of mass culture are meant to be controlled in 
the interest of pecuniary gain. The Hollywood film business may or may not have 
successful strategies for creating an order of cinema through the control of 
filmmaking—that is yet to be determined—but it must translate the political, cultural 
and aesthetic qualities of cinema into the quantitative language of capital. Nitzan and 
Bichler’s argument about the eye of capitalization explains why a film’s many 
qualities—e.g., its genre, style, story, cast, director, production quality—and its 
possible resonance with established cultural and political attitudes would all be 
‘integrated into the numerical architecture of capital’: the many dimensions of cinema 
could impact ‘the level and pattern of capitalist earnings’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, 
p.166). 
 
A film project is translated into the language of capital in its germinal stages, well 
before the first day of filming.  Expectations about future earnings are being 
discounted to present prices when some scripts are sold while others are ignored, 
when some projects are properly developed while others sit idle, and when some 
projects are produced while others never make it out of ‘development hell.’6 As Janet 
Wasko points out in contrast to popular belief, ‘Hollywood films do not begin when 
the camera starts rolling, but involve a somewhat lengthy and complex development 
and pre-production phase during which an idea is turned into a script and 
preparations are made for actual production followed by post-production’ (Wasko 
2008, p.43). A project begins as a film concept, usually in the form of a full script in its 
first draft. If approved by management, the project then goes into development 
(which is far from the production stage), usually under the wing of a development 
executive (Wasko 2008, p.45). In development, the film concept is polished, the script 
is edited and re-edited, sometimes even rewritten completely, and producers and 
agents start talking about the film’s possible ‘players’ (main cast and director). 
 
Throughout this process, the capitalization of cinema is concerned with how films will 
rank in the order of cinema. For one thing, the quantitative language of capital makes 
every film financially comparable. When a film is given an expected theatrical 
                                                        
6  A project is in ‘development hell’ when ‘a script is in development but never receives 
production funds’ (Wasko 2008, p.53). In his ‘how-to’ book about film financing, Michael 
Wiese estimates that major filmed entertainment produces one film for every fifty projects 
that remain damned in purgatory (Wiese 1991, p.32). 
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revenues plateau (e.g., $10 million, $50 million, $200 million), the Hollywood film 
business is making an estimate about the future popularity of the film (Barry Russell 
Litman 1998, p.44). And how a specific film is capitalized has something to do with 
its particular political, cultural and aesthetic qualities. Yet, this financial estimate 
automatically positions a film among other films. An estimate that a film will, for 
instance, earn $100 million in theatrical revenues is meaningful in relation to how 
other contemporary films are capitalized. An expectation of $100 million means one 
thing when, at a given time, $125 million in box-office revenues is the average 
expectation for most Hollywood films. It means something else when an estimation 
of $100 million puts the particular film at the top of its cohort. Depending on how 
other films are capitalized, capitalists could expect that $100 million in box-office 
revenues would make this film one of the top grossing films of its year of release.  
 
Knowing how the expectations of one film relates to the expectations of all other films 
in the same time period is also significant when there is historical evidence that top 
ranking films have been able to differentially perform. Predicting that a film will be 
one of the top grossing films of the year matters given that, since the late 1940s, the 
top one percent of films have increased their share of all box-office revenues per year. 
Mark Weinstein describes this phenomenon: ‘In the late 1940s, the top 1 percent of 
films represented 2 percent to 3 percent of studio revenue; by the early 1960s, this 
had tripled, to an average of about 6 percent. This trend has continued in recent years. 
In 1993 the world-wide revenues for the top 1 percent (two films) of 163 major-
studio released films were 13.8 percent of the total [revenues]’ (Weinstein 2005, 
p.252).  
 
Moreover, a confident prediction about how a film will rank in the order of cinema is 
also a strong recommendation about distribution strategy. It is common practice for 
the Hollywood film business to give wide theatrical releases to what it thinks will be 
‘blockbusters’ or ‘must-see events.’ This strategy is also known as saturation booking, 
in which a film is simultaneously shown on many screens in many theatres (Maltby 
2003, p.182). While it is a common one, this wide release strategy is relevant for our 
analysis of risk because it is not a universal strategy. Unlike ‘platform’ releases, which 
open in a small number of theatres, usually in select cities (New York, Los Angeles, 
etc.), ‘wide’ releases are designed to begin, from their very first week, in thousands of 
theatres across America. For example, Star Wars opened on nearly 3,000 theater 
screens in the United States (De Vany 2004, p.48). Furthermore, a wide release is 
meant to pull in the bulk of its revenues in the first few weeks of its theatrical 
release—e.g., the 2001 film The Mummy Returns earned 90% of its total theatrical 
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revenues in the first five weeks. Conversely, a platform release like O Brother, Where 
Art Thou? took four months to earn 90% of its total theatrical revenues.7 
 
The History of Risk Perceptions in Hollywood 
 
The remainder of this paper traces the historical development of risk in Hollywood 
cinema. This type of analysis is useful for the creation of an alternative, critical 
perspective on the Hollywood film business. Essentially, the historical development 
of risk is useful because it can frame any subsequent questions about how Hollywood 
has reduced risk. A critical study of how risk is effectively reduced through particular 
techniques, such as the repetition of genres, sequels and remakes, the cult of movie 
stars, and the institution of false needs and wants, can still head in the wrong direction 
if one is not cognizant of where latent theoretical assumptions in political economy 
leads them. While all of the differences between mainstream economics, Marxism and 
the capital-as-power theory cannot be enumerated here, we can, with respect to the 
purpose of this section, briefly focus on one important point. Risk-reduction 
strategies in Hollywood are a popular subject in mainstream economic literature, but 
these investigations tend to run into theoretical problems because the historical 
development of risk is virtually ignored (De Vany 2004; Barry Russell Litman 1998; 
Nelson & Glotfelty 2012; Pokorny 2005).  
 
Much of the academic literature on the Hollywood film business moves from the 
particular to the universal; its general conclusions about risk are drawn out of its 
empirical analyses that focus on one or many risk-reduction strategies. By making 
risk-reduction strategies its primary concern, mainstream academic literature turns 
filmmaking into a production function, and from there, the debate is about whether 
certain techniques are effective. Famous movie stars, with their perceived ability to 
draw consumers to some movies rather than others, are most commonly analyzed as 
being factors of production that are employed to reduce the financial risks of 
Hollywood cinema (Elberse 2007; Hadida 2010; Ravid 1999). Style is also a risk-
reduction technique, particularly the blockbuster method of filmmaking (Barry R. 
Litman 1983; Ravid 1999; Denisoff & Plasketes 1990). 
 
These investigations, however, say little about the historical development of risk. In 
fact, the possibility for risk perceptions to significantly change over time is out of 
place in studies that also assume so-called economic actors are too small to change 
the historical circumstances of risk. In the mainstream literature, risk-reduction 
                                                        
7 These two examples, The Mummy Returns and O Brother, Where Art Thou?, are taken from 
Maltby’s Hollywood Cinema (Maltby 2003, pp.200, 204). 
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strategies like using movie stars or making blockbuster movies, no matter how 
effective, never transform the business environment itself (De Vany 2004, p.270). In 
part because its oligopolistic character is downplayed or even ignored, the Hollywood 
film business, as a whole, is seen to have an ‘inherent’ level of risk that remains in 
spite of any strategy. In this ‘power-free’ version of Hollywood cinema, risk-reducing 
techniques are essentially conservative reactions to consumer sovereignty, which is 
always an extraneous force. Techniques can be effective, they can even somehow 
‘lower risks for subsequent projects,’ but, in this theoretical narrative, capitalists 
cannot create a cultural environment that favors their pecuniary interests. The world 
of cinema can never be made to have machine-like regularity if it is assumed the 
sovereign consumer is an unalterable variable that always has the same ‘economic’ 
freedom to be fickle when the next film is released (Garvin 1981, p.4). 
 
The notion that risk has an ‘inherent’ level because firms only ever mitigate the 
volatility of consumer sovereignty, adds an unnecessary theoretical obstacle to an 
investigation of how Hollywood’s risk coefficient has changed over time. This is 
certainly the case when an individual author considers the ‘inherent’ level of risk to 
be so high that ex ante predictions are impossible. Arthur De Vany, for instance, uses 
complex statistical modeling to substantiate screenwriter William Goldman’s 
statement that, with respect to making predictions about the future of Hollywood 
cinema, ‘nobody knows anything.’ According to De Vany: 
 
…revenue forecasts have zero precision, which is just a way of saying that ‘anything 
can happen’…. The ‘nobody knows’ principle…is revealed in the infinite variance and 
scale-free form of the probability distribution. When the probability distribution is 
scale free it has no characteristic size and there is no typical movie. If variance is 
infinite, the prediction is impossible; one can only say that the expected revenue of a 
movie is X plus or minus infinity (De Vany 2004, pp.71, 260).  
 
De Vany’s conclusion that ‘the confidence interval of [a] forecast is without bounds’ 
(De Vany 2004, p.71) is unsatisfying because it is embedded in a framework that 
assumes the Hollywood film business is eternally beholden to this extremely high 
degree of uncertainty. To be sure, it could certainly be possible that Hollywood has 
had a period of great uncertainty; however, an analysis of risk cannot help but reify 
its conclusions when the analysis also holds onto a hollow concept of history.8   
                                                        
8 On this point, it is helpful to briefly juxtapose the concept of history that is at the core of the 
capital-as-power approach. For Nitzan and Bichler, we say that societies are historical 
because human beings have the ability to change the foundations of a social order through 
active creation. Nitzan and Bichler capture this point with the verb-noun creorder: ‘Historical 
society is a creorder. At every passing moment, it is both Parmenidean and Heraclitean: a state 
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How can we investigate the historical development of risk in Hollywood cinema? My 
method involves using opening theatres as a proxy for future expectations. Opening 
theatres stands as a proxy for future expectations because the decision about the size 
of opening theatres is made before a stream of box-office revenues actually begins to 
flow; decisions about what is a good release strategy for each film derive from 
financial expectations about what will happen to each film on its opening weekend 
and onwards. Furthermore, as I established above, the Hollywood film business is 
concerned with the future pecuniary rank of its films, which relates to the strategy of 
giving some films, but not all, wide theatrical releases. To be sure, not every high 
grossing film is the product of a wide release strategy. A platform release can, over 
time, become popular and consequently earn a relatively high level of gross revenues. 
For example, Schindler’s List opened in 25 theatres and was the ninth highest grossing 
film of 1993. Yet, behind the fact that some films are, from day one, released in 1500, 
2000 or even more theatres, is an assumption about expected revenues. In a sense, 
major filmed entertainment does not wait for its wide releases to eventually become 
popular. A wide release has, in comparison to a platform release, a shorter lifespan 
because its impact is supposed to be quick but big.  
 
Historical data on opening theatres enables us to approximate the evolution of 
Hollywood’s risk coefficient (δ), which denotes the confidence the Hollywood film 
business has in its predictions about the future financial performance of cinema. This 
approach demonstrates that from 1981 to 2011, Hollywood has been able to improve 
its ability to predict the financial performance of its films. This increased 
predictability reflects a better understanding of and perhaps a greater ability to shape 
popular culture. And this greater understanding and ability in turn translates into 
higher confidence, lower risk perception and higher capitalization. 
 
How can we use opening theatres to approximate the long-term trajectory of 
Hollywood’s risk perceptions? On the idea that opening theatres is a proxy for future 
expectations, opening theatres data can be used to compare expected theatrical gross 
                                                        
in process, a construct reconstructed, a form transformed. To have history is to create 
order…’ (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.305). This concept of history draws from the philosophy of 
Cornelius Castoriadis, who offers us the term ‘social-historical.’ For Castoriadis, it is 
‘impossible to maintain an intrinsic distinction between the social and the historical, even if 
it is a matter of affirming that historicity is the ‘essential attribute’ of society or that society 
is the ‘essential presupposition’ of history…. It is not that every society is necessarily ‘in’ time 
or that a history necessarily ‘affects’ every society. The social is this very thing—self-
alteration, and it is nothing if it is not this. The social makes itself and can make itself only as 
history’ (Castoriadis 1998, p.215). 
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revenues and actual theatrical gross revenues. Take, for example, 1986. To get a sense 
of Hollywood cinema in 1986, one can go to a website like boxofficemojo.com and 
reproduce Table 1, which is presented here in abridged format. This table ranks, in 
descending order, 1986 films in the first column by their domestic box-office gross 
revenues in the second. In addition, a third column shows the number of opening 
theatres for each film. Table 1 is interesting for a few reasons. What first stands out is 
Platoon, which opened in six theatres but eventually went on to become the third 
highest grossing film of 1986. This would be a good example of a highly successful 
platform release. The second and perhaps more important point is that there is no 
one-to-one match between revenue rankings and opening theatre rankings. For 
example, the two top grossing films—Top Gun and Crocodile Dundee—did not have 
the two widest releases of that year. Already on this abridged list, we can see five films 
that had wider releases in 1986. 
 
Table 2 offers a different view of the same year. It sorts out all of the films released in 
1986 not by box-office revenues, but by opening theatres. Aside from two films, Back 
to School and The Golden Child, none of the films in Table 2 appear in Table 1. The 
films in Table 2 had the widest releases in 1986 but only two of them were able to 
even reach the $50 million plateau. 
 
Film 
Box-Office Gross 
Revenues 
Opening 
Theatres 
Top Gun $176,786,701 1,028 
Crocodile Dundee $174,803,506 879 
Platoon $138,530,565 6 
The Karate Kid Part II $115,103,979 1,323 
Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home $109,713,132 1,349 
Back to School $91,258,000 1,605 
Aliens $85,160,248 1,437 
The Golden Child $79,817,937 1,667 
… … … 
 
Table 1 Films Released in 1986: Ranked by Box-Office Gross Revenues 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening 
theatres. 
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Film 
Box-Office Gross 
Revenues 
Opening 
Theatres 
Cobra $49,042,224  2,131 
Police Academy 3: Back in Training $43,579,163  1,788 
Raw Deal $16,209,459  1,731 
The Delta Force $17,768,900  1,720 
The Golden Child $79,817,937  1,667 
Friday the 13th Part VI $19,472,057  1,610 
Back to School $91,258,000  1,605 
Poltergeist II: The Other Side $40,996,665  1,596 
… … … 
 
Table 2 Films Released in 1986: Ranked by Opening Theatres 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening 
theatres. 
 
Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 compare the top performing films (ranked by gross 
revenues) to what Hollywood expected the top performing films to be (ranked by 
opening theatres). Figure 1 extends this comparison over time. The figure contains 
three time series. Top 10%revenues measures, for each year, the US box-office gross 
revenues of the top 10% of all films, ranked by box-office gross revenues (comparable 
to Table 1). The revenue data are presented as a percent share of all US box-office 
gross revenues for each year. The second series, Top 10%theatres, measures, for each 
year, the US box-office gross revenues of the top 10% of all films, ranked by opening 
theatres (comparable to Table 2). This series is also presented as a percent share of 
all US box-office gross revenues. 
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Figure 1 US Gross Theatre Revenues: The Share of the Top 10% of All Films 
 
Note: Boxofficemojo.com provides, from 1981 to 2011, data for each film 
released in the United States. After grouping every film from 1981 to 2011 by 
their year of release, I sort each year twice: once to rank all films by their gross 
revenues, and another time by their opening theatres. Both times I measure the 
Top 10% share of the yearly total of US gross revenues. Each year, the measure 
of Top 10% is adjusted by the annual total of films released in the United States. 
 
Note: The series that is sorted by opening theatres is not simply measuring 
opening weekend revenues. It measures total theatrical gross of each relevant 
film. 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for number of films released per year, US 
theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres for each film, and the sum of all 
US theatrical gross revenues. 
 
Similar to Weinstein’s observations, Top 10%revenues demonstrates how the top tier 
of films has, over a twenty-year period, increased its share of all US box-office gross 
revenues. The top 10% of films in 1981 grabbed approximately 41% of all US box-
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office gross revenues for that year. In 2007 the films in the top 10% grabbed a 75% 
share of all US box-office revenues. 
 
What is more interesting for our purpose, however, is the relationship between Top 
10%revenues and Top 10%theatres. From the mid-1990s onwards, their fluctuations 
grow increasingly correlated.9 Additionally, over time the two series converge. This 
second observation is expressed with the third series of Figure 1, Top 10%predictability. 
Top 10%predictability presents, from 1981 to 2011, the ratio of Top 10%revenues to Top 
10%theatres. 
 
We can see that, over time, (1) the size of the ratio has decreased, getting closer and 
closer to 1, and (2) that the fluctuations in this ratio have lessened. What does it mean 
when Top 10%predictability is close to 1? Technically, it means that Top 10%revenues and 
Top 10%theatres are counting more of the same films. In other words, in a year when 
Top 10%predictability is close to 1, the highest grossing films were also, more or less, 
given the widest releases. Conceptually, the declining ratio and fluctuations of Top 
10%predictability suggest that Hollywood is getting better at predicting which movies will 
financially perform better than their cohorts. As the ratio approaches 1, the top 10% 
of the films put up for wide release end up also being the top 10% in terms of gross 
revenues, which is significant if the top tier of films are grabbing larger shares of all 
box-office revenues. 
 
Ranked by Box-Office Gross Revenues  Ranked by Opening Theatres 
Spider-Man 3  Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s…  
Shrek the Third  Harry Potter and the Order…  
Transformers  Spider-Man 3 
Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s…  Shrek the Third 
Harry Potter and the Order…  Transformers 
I Am Legend  Fantastic Four: Rise of the Silver Surfer 
The Bourne Ultimatum  Ratatouille 
National Treasure: Book of Secrets  Bee Movie 
…  … 
 
 Table 3 Rankings in 2007 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening 
theatres. 
 
                                                        
9 The correlation coefficient between Top 10%revenues and Top 10%theatres can be broken down 
into five periods: 1981-1987 (-0.49), 1988-1993 (+0.22), 1994-1999 (+0.86), 2000-2005 
(+0.94) and 2006-2011 (+0.89). 
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For instance, in 2007, the value of the ratio was 1.089. Out of a possible 63 films, 46 
films are included in both Top 10%revenues and Top 10%theatres of that year. We can 
catch a glimpse of this fact by examining the top films of 2007 in Table 3. Table 3 
reproduces for 2007, in abbreviated form, the two perspectives of Tables 1 and 2. In 
1986 only two films appeared in both Table 1 and Table 2—Back To School and The 
Golden Child. As Table 3 demonstrates, five films appear in both rankings for 2007. 
Furthermore, the same five films of 2007 occupy, although in different order, both top 
five spots.  
 
Future Research on the Hollywood Film Business 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates how, from 1981 to 2011, the Hollywood film business has been 
able to improve its predictions about what films will be in the top 10% of each 
calendar year, ranked by box-office gross revenues. This improvement is a product of 
predicting, with greater confidence, which films will earn a greater share of all 
revenues through a wide release strategy. If the example of 2007 is any indication of 
risk perceptions about the contemporary order of Hollywood cinema, we can infer 
that major filmed entertainment has been able to predict the shape of this order with 
a greater degree of confidence.  
 
Figure 1 can extend into future research on the capitalist nature of Hollywood. Its 
implications can be developed both empirically and theoretically. The next research 
task at hand is to refine this method of accounting for the future expectations of the 
Hollywood film business. For instance, the scope of Figure 1 is the top 10% of each 
year. This scope can be widened or narrowed with future applications. Figure 2, for 
example, is the same as Figure 1, except that the former focuses on the top 5% of each 
year. Not only does Figure 2 corroborate what Figure 1 demonstrates, Top 
5%predictability can be compared to Top 10%predictability. This comparison is made in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 2 US Gross Theatre Revenues: The Share of the Top 5% of All Films 
 
Note: Boxofficemojo.com provides, from 1981 to 2011, data for each film 
released in the United States. After grouping every film from 1981 to 2011 by 
their year of release, I sort each year twice: once to rank all films by their gross 
revenues, and another time by their opening theatres. Both times I measure the 
Top 5% share of the yearly total of US gross revenues. Each year, the measure 
of Top 5% is adjusted by the annual total of films released in the United States. 
 
Note: The series that is sorted by opening theatres is not simply measuring 
opening weekend revenues. It measures total theatrical gross of each relevant 
film. 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for number of films released per year, US 
theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres for each film, and the sum of all 
US theatrical gross revenues. 
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Figure 3 Two Measures of Declining Risk 
 
Note: See Figures 1 and 2. 
 
This paper can also be the stepping-stone to a larger investigation of the power 
underpinnings of Hollywood’s risk perceptions. The rise of a confident Hollywood 
suggests that its firms have found more effective means of developing, green-lighting 
and producing the ‘right’ set of films. Using the capital-as-power framework, we can 
ask bigger questions about the ways in which the art of filmmaking is made to dance 
to the tune of business enterprise. The capitalization of cinema, like that of every 
other creative activity, requires that the industrial art of filmmaking be strategically 
sabotaged. For the Hollywood film business to invest in—and therefore enable the 
creation of—some films but not all possible types of film, is to strategically sabotage 
aspects of social creativity and imagination. Future research on strategic sabotage 
could go a long way in helping us understand how cinema, under the eye of 
capitalization, is an order of quantifiable qualities, where the hope is that its films 
develop predictable financial trajectories, just like the paths of comets in the sky.  
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